) with voting behavior in the previous Parliament (1999Parliament ( -2004. We looked at party cohesion, coalition formation, and the spatial map of voting by members of the European Parliament. We found stable levels of party cohesion and interparty coalitions that formed mainly around the left-right dimension. Ideological distance between parties was the strongest predictor of coalition preferences. Overall, the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 did not change the way politics works inside the European Parliament. We also looked at the specific case of the controversial Services Directive and found that ideology remained the main predictor of voting behavior, although nationality also played a role.
Scholars have extensively analyzed how members of the European Parliament (MEPs) vote (see, for example, Attina 1990; Roland 2006, 2007; Kreppel 2002; and Raunio 1997) . In particular, we have, with Gérard Roland, studied the behavior of MEPs in more than 12,000 roll-call votes between 1979 and 2004 (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007) . Research indicates that MEPs vote increasingly along party lines and decreasingly along national lines. Also, the cohesion of the European political groups has increased, and the political groups have become increasingly competitive, with left-right splits becoming more common than the grand coalition between the two largest groups (the European People's Party and the Socialists). The main dimension of politics in the European Parliament has been shown to be the classic left-right dimension. In short, the European Parliament is much like other democratic parliaments-dominated by parties and left-right politics, and increasingly so.
Did the European Union's incorporation of 10 new member-states in 2004 change these patterns? At least two theoretical effects might have resulted from the 2004 enlargement. First, there may have been a "size effect" as the European Parliament grew larger. The number of member-states increased from 15 to 25, the number of MEPs increased from 626 to 732, and the number of national parties in Parliament increased from 122 to 175. In our previous research, we found that as the political groups grew in size, their voting cohesion actually increased rather than decreased, because of greater incentives to specialize and divide tasks between leaders and followers in larger parties.
Second, a "composition effect" may have changed coalition formation between MEPs and national parties. With the 2004 enlargement, the European Parliament became more politically, economically, and culturally heterogeneous than before. The 10 new member-states have lower income per capita than most of the original fifteen memberstates, and the level of inequality between the E.U. states is now comparable to the level of inequality between the states in the United States (Morrisson and Murtin 2004) . Increased economic inequality may go hand in hand with political polarization in the European Parliament, as it has in the U.S. Congress (see McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2003) . And, given the cultural, economic, and historical differences between the new and old member-states, a new east-west cleavage may have emerged in the new Parliament (cf. Schmitt and Thomassen 2005) .
In short, one might expect the MEPs from the new member-states to behave somewhat differently from the MEPs from the older memberstates, which would, among other things, reduce transnational party cohesion. To determine if the new MEPs indeed behaved differently, we analyzed all roll-call votes in the first half of the Sixth Parliament (July 2004 -December 2006 . We compared aggregate-and individuallevel MEP behavior in these votes with MEP behavior in all the rollcall votes in the Fifth European Parliament (July 1999 -May 2004 .
In Section 1 of this article, we look at the levels of cohesion of the political groups and the member-state groups of MEPs. In Section 2, we turn to the patterns of competition and coalition behavior between the political parties. In Section 3, we present a spatial analysis of individual MEP voting. In Section 4, we focus on the highly controversial legislation known as the Services Directive, which proposed opening up the services sector to cross-border competition. A final section concludes.
Party and Member-State Cohesion
To measure the voting cohesion of political party and national groups in the European Parliament, we used the agreement index we developed in previous work (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2005) . Any group of MEPs will appear more cohesive in lopsided votes (purely as a function of the fact that almost all legislators voted the same way) than they will in more evenly split votes. So, to compare how cohesion changed over time, irrespective of the majority size in votes, we calculated the relative cohesion score for each group of MEPs, which is the basic cohesion score of the group of MEPs in a vote divided by the majority size in the vote. Three patterns are worth noting. First, voting in the European Parliament occurs more along transnational party lines than along national lines; the transnational parties are more cohesive than the memberstate-based groups. Second, the gap between voting along party lines and national lines has increased since the early 1990s, with party cohesion growing while member-state-based cohesion has remained constant. Third, this gap has remained constant in the first half of the Sixth Parliament relative to the whole of the Fifth Parliament (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) . Tables 1 and 2 Table 1 shows that these nation-based voting patterns generally hold across legislative votes, nonlegislative votes, and budgetary votes. Note also the slightly higher levels of member-state-based cohesion on budgetary votes compared to legislative votes. Even on budgetary issues, however, MEPs vote with their transnational parties more often than they do with their national colleagues in other political groups.
Party cohesion remained stable despite the 2004 enlargement. Relative party cohesion declined slightly, but not significantly (by -.014, p-value = .113). 3 The Socialists (SOC) and the Greens (G/EFA) remained the most cohesive parties, whereas the Nationalists (UEN) and the Anti-Europeans (IND/DEM) remained the least cohesive. Although the Greens were less cohesive in the first half of the Sixth Parliament than in the whole of the Fifth, the biggest decline in relative cohesion was among the Liberals (ALDE). This is not surprising, since the Liberals are more ideologically heterogeneous after integrating the Italian Margherita Party and the Union for French Democracy Party (UDF), erstwhile Conservatives. The two largest groups (Conservatives and Socialists) became slightly less cohesive, while the Radical Left, Nationalists, and the Anti-Europeans became slightly more cohesive. Party cohesion was very stable across different types of votes. The lower relative cohesion of parties on budgetary votes stems from the European Parliament as a whole being more cohesive on budgetary issues than on legislative or nonlegislative issues. Indeed, the majority size on budgetary issues is about 77%. On legislative and nonlegislative issues, the majority sizes are 73% and 71%, respectively. Sixth European Parliament
Party Competition and Coalitions
To discuss patterns of party competition and coalitions, we refer to Table 3 , which shows the proportion of times the majorities in any two parties voted the same way in the first half of the Sixth Parliament compared to the proportions of agreement for the whole of the Fifth Parliament.
The first regularity is the stability of the left-right structure of competition. In both Parliaments, any political party was more likely to vote the same way as a party closer to it on the left-right dimension than with a party farther away on this dimension. For example, in the Sixth Parliament, the Nationalists, the farthest-right party, voted 84% of the time with the Conservatives, 72% with the Liberals, 63% with the Socialists, 45% with the Greens, and 42% with the Radical Left. Only the Anti-Europeans and the Nonattached members (NA) do not fit this left-right pattern, because the primary objective of these two groups is to protest the main political groups. Hence these two groups voted least often with the two biggest parties and more often with the parties on the left and right extremes. The protest behavior of these two groups is consistent across both Parliaments. . Each cell shows the percentage of times the majority of parliament members in the two political groups voted the same way in all the roll-call votes in the given period.
As for the two biggest parties, the Conservatives and Socialists voted together slightly more often in the first half of the Sixth Parliament (68% of the time) than they did in the Fifth Parliament (65%). It is worth noting, however, that this voting agreement is still lower than was shown at the peak of cooperation between the two parties, in the Third Parliament (1989-94) , when the Conservatives and Socialists voted together 71% of the time (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2005, 221) .
Underneath the generally stable structure of party alignments, however, we can see several subtle changes in competition and coalition behavior between the Fifth and the Sixth Parliaments. First, the behavior of the Liberals changed. In the Fifth Parliament, the Liberals voted more often with the Socialists than with the Conservatives (73% compared to 68%), but in the Sixth Parliament, the Liberals voted more often with the Conservatives than with the Socialists (78% compared to 75%). Second, the pattern of behavior within the right and within the left changed between the Fifth and Sixth Parliaments. On the right, the Conservatives and Nationalists voted together more often, as did the Liberals and Nationalists. On the left, the Socialists voted slightly less often with the Greens and Radical Left.
Overall, these patterns suggest that whereas in the Fifth European Parliament the Liberals were pivotal in deciding whether a majority coalition formed from the right or from the left, in the first half of the Sixth Parliament there was a clearer center-right majority bloc (between the Liberals, Conservatives, and Nationalists). The three groups on the center-left and left (Socialists, Greens, and Radical Left) were in the minority position and were less united.
Spatial Maps of Individual MEPs' Voting Behavior
To analyze individual voting patterns, we applied Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) NOMINATE geometric scaling method to the European Parliament roll-call votes. This method allowed us to measure how much variance each recovered dimension explained and to determine ideal-point estimates for every MEP (cf. Roland 2006, 2007) . Although NOMINATE cannot reveal anything about the substantive meaning of each of the dimensions (no scaling method can), the spread of the party clusters in Figure 2 suggests that the first dimension in both Parliaments is clearly the left-right dimension. On the farthest left are the Radical Left and Greens, the Socialists are on the centerleft, the Liberals are in the center, the Conservatives are on the centerright, and farthest right are a group of MEPs from the Conservatives who vote differently from the main Conservatives approximately 30% of the time.
The second dimension is more difficult to interpret. At face value, this dimension appears to represent anti-/pro-Europe policy preferences: toward the top of the figure are the more pro-European parties (Socialists, Conservatives, and Liberals), and near the bottom are the more anti-European parties (Radical Left, Greens, Nationalists, and Anti-Europeans). A more-detailed analysis of MEP locations reveals that this second dimension also captures government-opposition interests in the European Union: MEPs from national parties that are in government appear near the top on this second dimension; MEPs from national parties in opposition appear near the bottom (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006) .
If we compare the figures for the two Parliaments, we find a stable pattern of MEP voting behavior. There is one important difference, however: the Liberal MEPs are closer to the Conservative MEPs in the Sixth Parliament than they were in the Fifth Parliament. Admittedly, it is difficult to compare NOMINATE scores across legislatures without a dynamic model. Nonetheless, similar maps across legislatures indicate voting patterns that are, at least to some extent, similar.
For the Sixth Parliament, the average correct classification score is .871 for the first dimension and .873 for the second dimension. The average proportional reduction in errors is .555 for the first dimension and .560 for the second dimension. The increases in these goodnessof-fit statistics when we add a second dimension are thus small, indicating that the second dimension does not capture a large proportion of the variance of voting. The statistics are similar for the Fifth Parliament: .875 and .512 for the first dimension, and .899 and .605 for the second dimension. 4 In other words, the results for individual MEP voting reinforce our findings from the aggregate-level data on party cohesion and coalition behavior. In both the Fifth and Sixth Parliaments, the transnational parties were highly cohesive and the main dimension of competition was the left-right dimension. The only clearly identifiable difference between the two Parliaments, in both the aggregate and individual data, was in the relationship between the Liberal MEPs and the Conservatives. In the Fifth Parliament, the Liberals represented a more or less midway position between the Socialists and Conservatives. In the Sixth Parliament, the Liberals were closer to the Conservatives than the Socialists.
A Case Study: The Directive on Services in the Internal Market
The results we have discussed thus far are based on the aggregation of a large number of votes. One could argue that a conclusion based on a large number of votes, many of which are not very salient, will not necessarily apply when MEPs are faced with an important issue that might divide them more clearly along national lines. To address this argument, we looked at the highly important and controversial Directive on services in the internal market. 5 The Services Directive aimed to open the services sector to cross-border competition, mainly by removing the service-industry regulations of individual E.U. member-states (unless those regulations ensured nondiscriminatory practices or could be justified on the grounds of public interest). The Services Directive was considered by its supporters to be essential for the development of a genuine European Union single market in services. For opponents, however, the directive threatened to push down wages, lower social and environmental protections, and create an influx of foreign workers.
The European Parliament voted on the Services Directive on February 16, 2006. We collected the 81 roll-call votes on the directive. The cohesion scores of the political groups and the member-states on these votes indicate that the political groups were, on average, more cohesive than the member-states. That said, the MEPs from the new member-states seemed more likely to vote along national lines than the MEPs from the original member-states.
To analyze how MEPs voted on this legislation, we created an index from MEP voting behavior on these 81 votes. We first looked at the exact subject of each vote, to determine the direction, or policy implication, of the outcome of the vote. Some proposals aimed to liberalize services (a proliberalization issue); others aimed to reduce the scope of this legislation (an antiliberalization issue). Proliberalization MEPs should have voted "yes" on proliberalization issues and "no" on antiliberalization issues. We granted 1 point if an MEP voted in a proliberalization way (voting "yes" if the issue was proliberalization or "no" if the issue was antiliberalization) and 0 if the MEP did not vote in a proliberalization way ("no" on a proliberalization proposal, "yes" on an antiliberalization vote). We then calculated the final score for an MEP as the sum of the points each MEP was assigned, divided by the number of roll-call votes (81). Thus, if a legislator voted in a proliberalization way on all 81 votes, then that legislator scored 1. If the MEP voted in an antiliberalization way on all 81 votes, then that MEP scored 0.
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To determine the factors influencing MEP voting on the Services Directive, we estimated a simple regression model of the form:
where Y is the dependent variable, α is a constant, each β is a regression coefficient, ε is an error term, and each MEP is indexed by m.
Our dependent variable is the score of each MEP on the liberalization index. For explanatory variables, we used individual-level data as well as member-state-level data. Our individual-level data include the left-right ideology of each MEP and the MEP's attitude toward the European Union. These left-right ideology and pro-/anti-European Union variables are coordinates of the first and second dimensions, respectively, of the voting space estimated with NOMINATE using the 2004-06 data. Because the roll-call data used to compute these variables come from the previous year, this variable can be considered exogenous. To distinguish between ideology and party effects, or to differentiate between within party ideology and between party ideology, we included party dummy variables in one specification. We also used member-state-level data, such as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, and a dummy variable indicating if the MEP was from a new member-state. We intended this last variable to capture the effect of Central and Eastern European countries, since eight out of ten new member-states are from Central and Eastern Europe.
The results of our ordinary least squares estimations appear in Table 4 . The left-right ideology of an MEP is highly significant across all specifications, except when political-group dummy variables are included. This result suggests that MEPs in right-wing groups generally voted in favor of the Services Directive, while MEPs in left-wing groups generally voted against it. The pro-/anti-European Union position of an MEP is also significant, with the expected positive sign. New member-state status is positive and significant, suggesting that MEPs from new member-states voted for the Services Directive. The effect of GDP per capita is significant and negative, meaning that members from rich countries generally opposed liberalization of the services sector. We also computed standardized beta coefficients, which reveal that the two most important predictors are the left-right ideology of the MEP and whether or not the MEP represents a new member-state. A one-standard-deviation change in the left-right ideology variable yields a 0.60-standard-deviation change in the dependent variable. A one-standard-deviation change in the variable for new member-state status yields a 0.17-standard-deviation change in the dependent variable.
Conclusion
In general, despite the enlargement of the European Union with ten new member-states in May 2004, voting behavior in the European Parliament has changed very little. MEPs still vote primarily along transnational party lines. The cohesion of the political groups in the European Parliament remains high and has neither increased nor declined significantly. Voting along national lines, in contrast, remains low. Furthermore, the dominant dimension of competition in the European Parliament is the left-right dimension. These results reinforce the findings of our previous research, that the European Parliament is dominated by political parties and by left-right politics.
Nevertheless, there were two main changes in voting behavior between the Fifth European Parliament (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) and the first half of the Sixth European Parliament . First, in the Fifth Parliament, the Liberals voted approximately the same amount of time with the Socialists as they did with the Conservatives, but in the Sixth Parliament, the Liberals voted significantly more often with the Conservatives than with the Socialists. This shift is consistent with the general view of the dominance of left-right politics in the European Parliament, because the changed behavior of the Liberals is a product of the rightwards shift in the membership of this group after two centerright parties left the Conservatives and joined the Liberals at the start of the Sixth Parliament.
The overall left-right makeup of the Fifth and Sixth Parliaments is very similar: the Conservatives are the largest group in both Parliaments, and the median member of both Parliaments is a Liberal. Yet the change in the coalition behavior of the Liberals may have a significant effect on the balance of power in the European Parliament. The left and right blocs were evenly balanced in the Fifth Parliament, with the Liberals determining which side would become the majority on any particular vote. In the Sixth Parliament, however, with the Liberals voting more often with the Conservatives and Nationalists, a center-right coalition dominates.
The second change in MEPs' voting behavior is a tendency among MEPs from the new member-states from Central and Eastern Europe to vote slightly more along national lines than do the MEPs from the original 15 member-states. This nation-based voting was particularly evident on the Services Directive. The MEPs from the new memberstates voted in a more-proliberalization way than did the MEPs from the older member-states, if one controls for the ideological preferences of the MEPs. Specifically, MEPs on the left from the new memberstates were less likely to be opposed to the liberalization of the services market than were MEPs on the left from the old member-states. Nevertheless, even on the most important and controversial piece of legislation thus far in the Sixth Parliament, ideological preference was the dominant factor.
